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COHERENCE AND THE EUROPEAN COURT
OF HUMAN RIGHTS: THE ADJUDICATIVE
BACKGROUND TO THE SOERING CASE
Colin Warbrick*
I.

INTRODUCTION

On January 1, 1990, the Eighth Protocol' to the European Convention on Human Rights 2 came into force. This Protocol makes
some amendments to the structure and procedure set out in the Convention itself.3 The need for reform was created by the increasing
workload of the institutions, which had reached such a level that the
backlog of applications before the Commission would have continued
to increase at a greater rate than the Commission's capacity to dispose
of them. 4 There are several reasons for this overwhelming burden.
The acceptances by States of the right of individual application under
article 255 have been increasing. By the end of 1989 all the parties to
the Convention had made declarations under article 25. An increasing
6
proportion of applications were being made with legal assistance,
with the result that the applicants were better prepared and more
likely to raise issues which could not be peremptorily dismissed. 7 In
addition, the development of the caselaw of the Convention by the
Court was opening possibilities for successful application on a range of
8
questions which covered common, not exceptional, circumstances.
* Senior Lecturer, Law Department, University of Durham. LL.B., M.A. (Cambridge),
LL.M. (Michigan 1969).
1. European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,
Nov. 4, 1950, Protocol No. 8, Mar. 19, 1985, Europ. T.S. No. 118 [hereinafter Protocol No. 8].
2. European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,
Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter Convention].
3. See Explanatory Report on Protocol No. 8 to the Convention for the Protectionof Human
Rights and FundamentalFreedoms, Council of Europe (1985) [hereinafter Explanatory Report].
4. EUROPEAN COMM'N OF HUMAN RIGHTS, SURVEY OF ACTIVITIES AND STATISTICS 1989
1-2 (1990) [hereinafter COMMISSION SURVEY OF ACTIVITIES AND STATISTICS]; Schermers, Has
the European Commission of Human Rights Got Bogged Down?, 9 HUM. RTS. L.J. 175 (1988).
5. There are currently twenty-two parties to the Convention. The most recent member of the
Council of Europe, Finland, has signed the Convention.
6. EUROPEAN COMM'N OF HUMAN RIGHTS, STOCK-TAKING ON THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS 118 (1988 Supp.) (1989).
7. Id. at 92.
8. Notable among these are Benthem v. Netherlands, 97 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1985) (Court
extended the protection of Art. 6(1) of the Convention to license applications); and 0 v. United
Kingdom, slip op., published as 120 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1987) (extending Artitle 6(1) protection to situations involving child-care decisions).
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The Commission simply had run out of ways within its own capacity
to reorganize its work to keep up with the demands being made upon
it.
The principal changes brought about by the Eighth Protocol are
that the Commission 9 may now sit in Chambers, each composed of at
least seven members of the Commission, and that it may establish
committees of at least three members with the power by unanimous
vote to declare cases manifestly inadmissible.10 The Chambers system
envisages that the membership of each will be fixed and organized in
such a way that on each Chamber there will be representation of the
major types of legal systems found within the Council of Europe and
that there will be an equitable geographical representation of the
Council's members. Ordinarily, the Commissioner elected in respect
of the respondent State will have the right to sit on the Chamber
which hears an application. The effect of this amendment is to allow a
departure from the original position that the Commission was obliged
to sit in plenary session. It still may do so. It must do so in three
cases: where it is examining an inter-State application, where it is considering whether to bring a case to the Court and where it is drawing
up rules of procedure. In addition, the Commission is expected to
make provision for consultation with the respondent State before a
case is referred to a Chamber.II
The Committee system has already started working. The Chambers arrangement will be brought in as the associated adjustments are
made within the Secretariat. These structural changes are supplemented by a development which has been going on for some time
whereby the part-time nature of the Commission has been transformed
into semi-permanent status. Sixteen "session weeks" are planned for
1990, quite apart from the considerable preparation which the Commissioners must do away from Strasbourg. 12 While all these changes
will undoubtedly increase the number of applications dealt with by the
Commission, the full effects of them are difficult to anticipate. One
possible consequence is to diminish the attraction of a Commission
appointment to persons holding other jobs, particularly in universities,
from which the Commission has hitherto recruited a significant proportion of its more active members. A certain outcome is that more
cases will be referred on to the Court.13 The Convention envisaged
9. Protocol No. 8, supra note 1, art. 1.
10. Id.
11. Explanatory Report, supra note 3, at 9-11.
12. COMMISSION SURVEY OF ACTIVITIES AND STATISTICS, supra note 4, at 2.

13. There has been a steady growth in the number of cases decided by the Court in each year.
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that the Court would normally sit in Chambers of seven judges and
surrender jurisdiction to the plenary bench only in exceptional circumstances. 14 In fact, the full Court has determined a third of the cases
which have come before the Court. The Eighth Protocol increases the
number of judges within a Chamber to hear a case from seven to
nine, 15 which will have a marginal impact on the balance between
cases decided by a Chamber and those adjudicated by the full Court.
The Court does not appear to be under anything like the same pressures as the Commission. It has been able to maintain an average of
about 15 months for disposing of cases referred to it.16 The Court is
always to some extent in the hands of the litigants, and the burdens on
it in terms of documentation appear to be increasing. Nonetheless, the
Court expects to keep delay under control, even with its anticipated
7
increasing load, as it too moves to semi-permanent status.'
The Commission is more circumspect about the ultimate efficacy
of these recent developments, suggesting that "a more comprehensive
reform" may be necessary.' 8 It has made reference to the "merger"
proposal which enjoyed great favor after the Neuchitel conference in
1985.19 The merger proposal envisages the absorption of the Commission into the Court to create a single institution to which individual
applicants would have direct access. Some of the considerable head of
steam which had been developing behind this proposition appears to
have dissipated. There are substantial practical obstacles in the way of
its realization, but it has not yet been rejected. The Steering Committee for Human Rights has recently issued a report of the Committee of
Experts for the improvement of procedures for the protection of
human rights on the principle of merger. 20 Although the report is
somewhat equivocal, the Steering Committee has asked the Committee of Experts to draw up a detailed structure for a single court sysIn 1989, it gave 25 judgments and at the end of 1989, 33 cases were pending before it. See
EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS, SURVEY OF ACTIVITIES 1959-1989, at 26-27 (1990).
14. Convention, supra note 2, art. 43.
15. Protocol No. 8, supra note 1, at 11.
16. EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 13, at 40-43.
17. Speech by Mr. Rolv Ryssdal, President of the European Court of Human Rights, to the

Council of Europe (to mark the occasion of the Court's first session of the New Year), Eur. Ct.
H.R., Cour (90) 16, at 2 (Jan. 24, 1990).
18. COMMISSION SURVEY OF ACTIVITIES AND STATISTICS, supra note 4, at 2.

19. Merger of the European Commission and European Court of Human Rights, 8 HUM. RTS.
L.J. 3 (1987) (Second Seminar on International Law and European Law at the University of

Neuchfitel, March 14-15, 1986) [hereinafter Merger of Commission and Court].
20. Report of the Committee of Expertsfor the Improvement of Proceduresfor the Protection
of Human Rights (DH-PR) to the Steering Committee for Human Rights (CDDH), Council of
Europe, Doc. No. H(89)2 (May 2, 1989).
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tem. 2' While the merger proposal will undoubtedly take some time, 22
even more time would have to elapse before it comes into force because substantial revision of the Convention would be necessary and that time will allow the effect of the latest reforms to be assessed.
The merger proposal is in large measure independent of this process.
It is part of a much grander agenda, explained in forthright terms by
Professor Trechsel in his introductory address to the Neuchitel
meeting:
I am convinced therefore that the merger of the Convention organs
into a permanent Court should be envisaged if the Convention for the
protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms is to continue
to be a shining example of the regional protection of human rights.
However, is this not taking the Utopian view? I think not. My reason? It lies in the true Utopia which is the back drop to our Convention.
What I mean by that is the Utopia of the European Confederation and
its Constitutional Court seeing to the observance of human rights. A
Court endowed with other powers and whose judgments would become
effective immediately. That is really Utopia - the merger of the Commission and the Court quite simply and quite practically constitutes the
only true way of enabling the control
machinery of the Convention to
23
break out of its present dead lock.
II.

THE INTERPRETATION OF THE CONVENTION

To express caution, even skepticism, in the face of such lofty idealism is to risk being accused of timidity and grubby pragmatism (at
best) or of defending the obstructive tendencies of the States which,
though they dare not speak it too loudly, are finding the Convention
obligations just too intrusive into their domestic jurisdictions. The
risk is all the greater because I write without practical experience as a
litigator at Strasbourg and without inside knowledge of the Strasbourg
process. My reservations spring from an academic study of the output
of the system, particularly the judgments of the Court. While I recognize the pressing nature of the practical problems which have beset the
institutions, I have nothing to offer by way of solution (although I
would be prepared for a little while to see how the reforms made by
the Eighth Protocol work out in practice). I dare say that my perspective is significantly affected by where I stand: it is a British stand21. Id. at 17.

22. See Petzold & Sharpe, Profileof the Future of European Courtof Human Rights, in PROTECTING HUMAN RIGHTS: THE EUROPEAN DIMENSION 471 (F. Matscher & H. Petzold eds.

1988).
23. Merger of Commission and Court, supra note 19, at 23.
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point 24 and that of an international lawyer rather than a constitutional
lawyer, which makes me more sympathetic to pragmatic and positivist
traditions of international law. 2 5 . My common law background leads
me as well to an understanding of the judicial process that is influenced by the workings of the American Supreme Court and constitutional courts of the Commonwealth rather than by their European
counterparts or the European Court of Justice in Luxembourg.
I start from two propositions which, though I take them to be selfevident, are seemingly not shared by all those who work about the
Strasbourg institutions. The first is that the Convention is a creature
of international law, a treaty, and that, accordingly, international law
is the "proper law" of the Convention. The other is that it was not the
intention of the parties to the Convention to invest the institutions
with supra-nationai authority: on the contrary, the elaborate structure
of the Convention and the contingent nature of the principal obligations were dictated by the intention of some States to protect, so far as
possible given the innovation that they were about to implement, the
international qualities of the Convention regime. 26 The Institutions
have not expressly laid claim to any grander basis for their authority,
though enthusiast. hanker after it on their behalf. The Court and
Commission have, of course, claimed that their law has distinctive
characteristics - that it is part of the "public order of Europe ' 27 but this reflects no more than that, even as international law, human
rights law has particular characteristics which distinguish it from the
generality of international law: the absence of direct reciprocity as the
basis for obligation, the independent weight to be given to the interests
of the individuals and, in the European system, the regular possibility
of judicial settlement of disputes. 28 In general, the Court has fashioned an approach to the interpretation of the Convention which takes
account both of its nature as an international treaty and of the rather
particular qualities of this treaty. 29 The Court, while relying on the
24. For some comments on the difference between British and U.S. approaches to the judicial

role, see R. DWORKIN, A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE 9-32 (1985).
25. See Warbrick, The Theory of InternationalLaw: Is There an English Contribution?,in
PERESTROIKA AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 41 (W. Butler ed. 1990). See also the comments of

Fifoot in Merger of Commission and Court, supra note 19, at 107-08.
26. Robertson, The European Conventionfor the Protectionof Human Rights, 27 BRIT. Y.B.
INT'L L. 145, 152-58.
27. Austria v. Italy, 1961 Y.B. EUR. CONY. ON HUM. RTs. (Eur. Comm'n of Hum. Rts.)
112, 140.
28. Drzemczewski, The Sui Generis Nature of the European Convention on Human Rights, 29
INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 54 (1980).
29. See J. MERRILLS, THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW BY THE EUROPEAN

COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTs 63-112 (1988).
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provisions of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 30 to provide the basic framework for interpretation, has given special weight
to the object and purpose of the Convention, which the Court takes to
31
be the effective protection of the human rights therein enunciated. It
has claimed the right to interpret the text of the Convention in the
32
light of legal and circumstantial developments in the Member States
and it has relied on the language of article 1 - the States "shall secure" the rights and freedoms of the Convention to identify positive
obligations for States - to imply obligations for States and to discover
State responsibility in circumstances where the material harm results
from the activities of another State or a private person or organization. 3 3 This is a substantial interpretive achievement, if unremarkable
by the standards of domestic constitutional law. It has resulted in
some unanticipated and intrusive judgments, but it recognizes some
clear limits, most notably the acknowledgment in the preamble that
the Convention is an arrangement to protect only some human
rights. 34 It will sometimes be right and necessary for the Court to
concede that an interest, however worthy of protection it might be, lies
beyond the scope of the Convention. The States of the Council of Europe have, from time to time, added to the list of substantive obliga35
tions for States by means of additional protocols to the Convention.
Given the language and structure of the protected rights in the
Convention, the interpretative power of the Court is a wide one.
While its performance in general has complied with the standards set
out above, there have been deviations from them when the Court has
striven to discover a means of protecting an individual without paying
much attention to any constraints in the Convention text. The extension of the meaning of "determination of his civil rights" in article 6(1)
to cover social insurance claims is a prominent example. 36 Another is
30. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, opened for signature May 23, 1969, arts. 3133, 1980 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 58 (Cmnd 7964), 63 A.J.I.L. 875, 8 I.L.M. 679 (1969).
31. Golder v. United Kingdom, slip op., 18 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1975).
32. Tyrer v. United Kingdom, slip op. at 8, published as 26 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1978);
Rees v. United Kingdom, slip op. at 9-10, published as 106 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 37 (1986).
33. See Frowein, Schulhoffer & Schapiro, FundamentalHuman Rights as a Vehicle of Legal
Integration in Europe, in 1 INTEGRATION THROUGH LAW: EUROPE AND THE AMERICAN FEDERAL EXPERIENCE, BOOK 3, 300-44 (1985).
34. See, e.g., Glasenapp v. Federal Republic of Germany, slip op., published as 104 Eur. Ct.

H.R. (ser. A) (1986).
35. See, e.g., Protocol to the Convention, Mar. 20, 1952, Europ. T.S. No. 9; Protocol No. 4 to
the Convention, Sept. 16, 1963, Europ. T.S. No. 46; Protocol No. 6 to the Convention (concerning the abolition of the death penalty), Apr. 28, 1983, Europ. T.S. No. 114; Protocol No. 7 to the
Convention, Nov. 22, 1984, Europ. T.S. No. 117.
36. See Feldbrugge v. Netherlands, slip op., published as 99 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1987);
Deumeland v. Federal Republic of Germany, slip op., published as 100 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A)
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the explanation of why a State's duties under the Convention extend to
not removing a person to the jurisdiction of another State where that
State might inflict treatment on him at variance with the Convention
standards. 37 The premise in the article 6(1) case was that individuals
have a high interest that decisions taken about matters important to
them in the national legal system be taken by a fair procedure before
an independent and impartial tribunal. 3a Whether the interest was a
"civil right" in Convention terms was determined by balancing the
"public" characteristics of the individual's interest against its "private" ones, a test not discernible in the Court's previous jurisprudence
and one which will lead to great uncertainty.3 9 In Soering, a complex
problem of State responsibility was decided by declaring a certain outcome "hardly compatible" 4 with the spirit of the Convention and extrapolating from this to cover the facts before the Court. I find the
reasoning in both cases unsatisfactory, little more than rationalizations
of preferred outcomes, and all the more regrettable because it produces, in the first case, a result which is difficult to sustain in general
policy terms, 4 1 and, in the second, one which could have been reached
42
by a more careful consideration of the principal issue.
What these judgments lack is coherence or plausibility, an essential
aspect of the legitimacy of constitutional judgments whatever the actual outcomes. 43 For English lawyers coherence has been seen mainly
as a technical matter of the interpretation of statutory language and
the manipulation of common-law precedents. 44 So long as judgments
of the courts spoke largely to fellow professionals, it was to judges and
lawyers that they had to appear convincing, and it would suffice for
them to do so within professional terms of reference. Even the established approach of the common law to matters of coherence was not
restricted solely to the texts, and understandings about values extraneous to them were essential to judicial reasoning. 45 This becomes even
more necessary where courts are faced with constitutional instruments
(1986). See also Drzemczewski & Warbrick, The European Convention on Human Rights, 6 Y.B.
EUR. L. 417, 432-37 (1986).
37. See Soering v. United Kingdom, slip op., published as 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1989).
38. This is made clearer in the dissenting opinion in Feldbrugge, slip op. at 25.
39. Feldbrugge, slip op. at 8-13.
40. Soering, slip op. at 26.
41. Feldbrugge, slip op. at 21-22 (dissenting opinion of Ryssdal, J. etal.).
42. See infra text accompanying notes 83-112.
43. See M. CAPPELLETTI, THE JUDICIAL PROCESS IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 3, 56

(1989).
44. See N. MACCORMICK, LEGAL REASONING AND LEGAL THEORY (1978).

45. See Simpson, The Common Law and Legal Theory, in LEGAL THEORY AND THE COMMON LAW 8-25 (W. Twining ed. 1986).
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expressed in the most general terms and intended to provide for the
resolution of some of the contested matters of power and the controversial issues of policy over a long period of time. As the experience of
the United States Supreme Court shows, the search for a single theory
is as unavailing as it is never-ending. The most realistic accounts of
constitutional interpretation accept that it is a continual process of refinement. 46 Some explanation may reduce the area of controversy by
reducing the opportunities for judicial review of the decisions of other
governmental institutions, but they can never make them disappear
altogether. 47 An additional complication is that constitutional decisions must speak to a much wider audience than lawyers; they must
address politicians and the people. The results of ordinary cases will
usually be moderated to non-professionals through the medium of a
lawyer. My concern is that the European Court has not reached a
high degree of coherence for its judgments and that there are obstacles
that will make it difficult for it to do so in the future.
If these assessments are right, one should pause before conferring
on the Court a supra-national or an internal constitutional role as the
merger proposals clearly imply. 48 There are two features of the
Court's manner of deciding cases which explain the Court's difficulties
in the quest for coherence. One is the Court's reluctance to engage in
theoretical or conceptual reasoning. The Court has said that it is not
necessary to work out general explanations of its doctrines of implied
rights and implied limitations on rights, 49 of the idea of "civil rights
and obligations," 5 of the extent of a State's responsibility for private
interference with rights,5 l and of the reach of State responsibility for
harm inflicted by another State. 52 Another aspect of this approach is
its reliance on "bright-line" solutions at the expense of more sensitive
analysis of the problem. In Tyrer, the inclusion of judicial corporal
punishment within the "degrading punishment" category of article 3
was expressed so definitively as to practically exclude a different reconsideration of corporal punishment in other circumstances.5 3 The re46. See L.

TRIBE, CONSTITUTIONAL CHOICES 3-28 (1985).
47. See J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST (1980).
48. "Supra-nationality" is an elusive category. The understanding of it in Western Europe
has been greatly influenced by the development of the European Community. See Weiler, The
Community System: The Dual Character of Supernationalism, 1 Y.B. EUR. L. 267-306 (1981).
49. Golder, slip op. at 13.
50. Benthem, slip op. at 10-11.

51. Plattform "Arzte fir das Leben" v. Austria, slip op. at 8, published as 139 Eur. Ct. H.R.
(ser. A) (1988).
52. Soering, slip op. at 24.
53. Tyrer, slip op. at 9-12.
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sult is a rule which some argue is over-inclusive. 54 To the opposite
effect are the Court's judgments in Glasenapp" and Kosiek. 56 Each
case involved the application of "loyalty oaths" to two teachers in the
Federal Republic of Germany as a condition of keeping their jobs after
each had made controversial statements. There were differences between the two cases as to the level at which the applicants taught and
what they had said. The Commission, in close decisions, examined the
German government's claims that the interferences with the applicants' rights to expression were justified as being necessary in a democratic society for the protection of national security.17 The Court, to
the contrary, considered that the applicants were seeking to exercise a
right of access to the public service, a right not protected by the Convention and, therefore, requiring no justification by the State to restrict
it. The result is an over-exclusive test, practically denying the protection of the expression of public servants. 58 The burden of achieving
coherence is a heavy one and, since there is no question of the capacity
of the judges to perceive the need for it, the reasoning in cases like
Feldbrugge,Soering or Glasenapp suggests that there might be institutional impediments in the way of achieving it. If there are, then the
role of the Court might properly be limited to the one which it has
sometimes claimed for itself, that of a subsidiary mechanism for the
protection of human rights to the schemes developed in the national
legal systems. 59
This conception of a restricted role for the Convention is a product
of several factors. Some of them are apparent on the face of the Convention. The obligation of States under article 13 to provide an effective national remedy for claims that the Convention has been violated
is one example.60 The duty of applicants to exhaust domestic remedies
as a condition of admissibility for applications to the Commission is
54. See Zellick, CorporalPunishment in the Isle of Man, 27 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 665, 670
(1978), criticizing the Court for its "failure to produce a convincing and well-argued judgment."
Although there has never been a definitive judgment of the Court on the question, it was widely
accepted that the terms of the Tyrer judgment meant that corporal punishment in schools was
contrary to the Convention, and United Kingdom law was eventually amended to take account
of this. Tyrer, slip op. at 8-16.
55. Glasenapp, slip op.
56. Kosiek v. Federal Republic of Germany, slip op., published as 105 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A)
(1986).
57. The Commission distinguished the two cases, finding a violation in Glasenapp by nine
votes to eight votes and no violation in Kosiek by ten votes to seven votes.
58. See Drzemczewski & Warbrick, supra note 36, at 437-40.
59. Handyside v. United Kingdom, slip op. at 17, published as 24 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A)
(1978).
60. Klass v. Federal Republic of Germany, slip op. at 21, published as 28 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser.
A) (1978); Silver v. United Kingdom, slip op. at 39, published as 61 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A)
(1983).
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another. 61 The Court has only a limited remedial power under article
5062 and judgments of the Court do not have automatic effect in the
legal systems of the Member States.63 The Court has often said that it
is for the respondent State to decide how it will implement an adverse
judgment of the Court to achieve concordance between the position in
national law and the State's duty under the Convention." The Court
has declined any role as a "court of fourth instance" to review national
court determinations of law or fact. Indeed, the fact-finding capacity
of the institutions is modest and cases reach the Court without significant factual discrepancies between the parties being resolved. 65 Also,
the institutions cannot but be aware of the conditional nature of the
commitment of most parties to the optional obligations under the Convention. So far, there has been a general trend toward expanding acceptance of these obligations, but the terms upon which Turkey has
recently agreed to the right of individual application give rise to disquiet, for, if they are not the subject of successful challenge, a device
has been found which would allow States to qualify their substantive
as well as their procedural obligations through the imposition of such
conditions. 66 The British government's response to the Brogan 67 judgment, which held that certain aspects of the pre-charge detention of
terrorist suspects was not in accordance with the Convention, has been
to rely on emergency derogation power under article 15, after it had
concluded that no solution was available which could preserve the
substance of the power compatibly with the requirements of article
5(3).68

These structural features of the Convention, which have persuaded
the Court that it has a somewhat limited role against the States, are
reinforced by functional characteristics of the Court itself. The Court
is an exceptionally large body, now twenty-three judges. The practical
authority of the judgments of any Court is enhanced if it can reach a
61. See P. VAN DUK AND G. VAN HOOF, THEORY AND PRACTICE OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 72-84 (1984).

62. See Gray, Remediesfor Individuals Under the European Convention on Human Rights, 6
HUM. R'is. REV. 153 (1981).
63. See Drzemczewski, Un Etat en violation de la Convention europienne des Droits de
l'Homme: l'execution interne des dicisions des institutions de Strasbourg, in PROTECTING HUMAN
RIGHTS, supra note 22, at 149.

64. Sunday Times v. United Kingdom, slip op. at 25-26, published as 30 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser.
A) (1979).
65. Eriksson v. Sweden, slip op. at 23-25, published as 156 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1989).
66. See Cameron, Turkey and Article 25 of the European Convention on Human Rights, 37
INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 887 (1988).
67. Brogan v. United Kingdom, slip op., published as 145 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1988).
68. 160 PARL. DEB., H.C. (6th ser.) 209 (1989).
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single opinion, or at least a single opinion of the majority. Reaching it,
though, can have disadvantages: a tendency to arrive only at the lowest common denominator or to disguise differences behind bland, general language. The reluctance of the European Court to engage itself
with considerations of general principle and its willingness to resort to
the "bright-line" solution to avoid troublesome issues of application
might be attributed to this characteristic. Besides, the issues which
face the Court, demanding enough within a single legal system, are
especially difficult when viewed against a wide variety of national legal
backgrounds. Despite the considerable role of the Commission in preparing the groundwork about the applicable national law, States have
claimed that some judgments are the result of influences of legal traditions not appropriate to their particular system. 69 Finally, because the
European Court is, unlike national tribunals, an international court
operating under an international treaty, its time can be taken up with
matters of international law, such as the reach of State responsibility 70
or the validity of reservations to the Convention 71 or, most likely of
all, the exhaustion of domestic remedies. 72 With the increased caseload that will inevitably fall on the Court, one's best guess, and a confident one, would be that the Court will find it difficult to adopt a much
different style of judicial reasoning and that the structural and functional barriers to developing a more coherent jurisprudence are unlikely to be removed by any variant of the merger proposal.
None of this is to say that the Court cannot improve the coherence
of its reasoning or to deny that there are good reasons for it trying to
do so. So long as it is not prepared to defer completely to the final
73
positions taken by the States, and the Court has shown that it is not,
then it will be put to explaining why the situation in the national legal
system is not in tune with the Convention. No reliance on the margin
of appreciation, no attempt to reduce its review to procedural matters
will avoid the Court having to face hard questions and to explain to
the States why it has resolved them as it has. It is true that the Court
69. See, e.g., Brogan v. United Kingdom, where the British government complained that the
Commission had been unduly influenced by inquisitional concepts of the criminal process. See
Verbatim Record of the Public Hearings Held on May 25, 1988 (Brogan Case), Eur. Ct. H.R.,
Cour/Misc (88) 162, at 35-36 (argument for the United Kingdom); Lamy v. Belgium, Cour (88)
64, at 11-13 (1988) (Memorial of Belgium), where the Belgian government argued that the Com-

mission had relied on an accusational understanding of criminal procedure.
70. Soering, slip op. at 24-25.
71. See Belilos v. Switzerland, slip op. at 15-22, published as 132 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A)
(1988); see also Marks, Reservations Unhinged: the Belilos Case before the European Court of
Human Rights, 39 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 300 (1990).

72. For recent examples, see Ciulla v. Italy, slip op., published as 148 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A)
(1989); Brozicek v. Italy, slip op., published as 167 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1989).
73. See, e.g., Sunday Times, slip op. at 25-26.
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has used both devices to do just that. There are indications that the
margin of appreciation doctrine is being transformed into a rather
more abstentionist device than it originally appeared to be. 74 In the
early judgments on freedom of expression, the language of the Court
was robust in defending the importance of expression and forthright in
setting out the burden on a State hoping to justify its interference with
an individual's right to free speech. In Handyside, the Court said:
Freedom of expression constitutes one of the essential foundations of [a
democratic] society, one of the conditions for its progress and for the
development of every man. Subject to paragraph 2 of Article 10, it is
applicable not only to 'information' or 'ideas' that are favorably received
or regarded as inoffensive or as a matter of indifference, but also to those
that offend, shock or disturb the State or any sector of the population.
Such are the demands of that pluralism, tolerance and broadmindedness
without which there is no 'democratic society.' This means amongst
other things, that every 'formality,' 'condition,' 'restriction' or 'penalty'
imposed 7in this sphere must be proportionate to the legitimate aim
pursued. "
The most recent judgments on this matter have revealed a more circumspect approach. In Barfod, the Court would not countenance a
vigorous criticism of the fairness of a judicial proceedings in Greenland, even though the State practically conceded the substance of the
observations and never made it clear on what basis it sought to justify
77
76
the criminal contempt conviction of the author. In Markt Intern,
even the language of the older judgments was abandoned. The Court
had to decide whether a regulation of the Federal Republic of Germany, made under its Unfair Competition Law, which forbade
"knocking copy" in commercial dealings could legitimately reach admittedly true allegations published in a magazine having no competitive relationship with the applicant. Rather than requiring the
demonstration of a "pressing social need" by the government, the
Court said:
It is obvious that opinions may differ as to whether the Federal Court's
reaction was appropriate or whether the statements made in the specific
case by Markt Intern should be permitted or tolerated. However, the
European Court of Human Rights should not substitute its own evaluation for that of the national courts in the instant case, where those
courts, on reasonable grounds, had considered the restrictions to be
74. The Court has been most unwilling to review a State's margin of appreciation in property
cases. For the most recent example, see Mellacher v. Sweden, slip op., published as 116 Eur. Ct.
H.R. (ser. A) (1989).
75. Handyside, slip op. at 17-18.
76. Barfod v. Denmark, slip op., published as 149 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1989).
77. Markt Intern Verlag Gmbh v. Federal Republic of Germany, slip op., published as 165
Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1989).
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necessary. 78

This will have the effect of removing the kind of difference between the
Court's and the Commission's view of the application of the Handyside test which arose in these cases, but it will do so on the basis of a
reduced role for the Court in reviewing national decisions on speech
questions. Such an approach requires practically no theory at all.
Another way is to try to limit the role of the Court by concentrating on the procedural remedies that the States must provide rather
than on the substantive outcomes. The Court has refined the obligation under article 13, first to give it some effective meaning and then to
bring it under practical control. 79 The Court has found further use for
this procedural route to confining its role in this way by restricting
article 6 determinations to matters of process and by implying procedural rather than substantive obligations in other rights.8 0 In Chappell, the Court deferred to the judgment of the national courts that,
despite obvious deficiencies in the execution of an order to preserve
evidence, there had been no failure to respect the applicant's home and
private life. 8 ' In Gaskin, the Court held that the obligation of the
State to respect the private life of a person brought up as a child in
publicly supervised foster-care required that the State establish an independent procedure to decide whether information about the applicant given in confidence could be revealed to him as an adult.82
Adopting this kind of approach leaves open the possibility that the
European institutions might have to decide whether the substantive
decision resulting from the national process is in violation of the Convention, but it will be a practical possibility only where a national decision is clearly incompatible with Convention standards, essentially
where some "bright line" has been passed.

III.

THE SOERING CASE

Many of the difficulties with the Court's manner of deciding cases
emerged in the Soering case,83 which was in several ways a special one.
78. Markt Intern Verlag GmbH, slip op. at 16.

79. See supra note 60.
80. See 0, slip op. at 17-21; Olsson v. Sweden, slip op. at 34, published as 130 Eur Ct. H.R.
(ser. A) (1988). See also Drzemczewski & Warbrick, The European Convention on Human Rights
8 Y.B. EUR. L. 305, 326-33 (1988).
81. Chappell v. United Kingdom, slip op., published as 152 Eur Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1989).
82. Gaskin v. United Kingdom, slip op., published as 160 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1989). This
is an important decision because the Court is generally punctilious to leave the means of giving
effect to its judgments to the national states. Here, finding a positive duty, the Court has to give
some indication of what such a duty involves.
83. For a recent analysis, see Breitenmoser and Wilms, Human Rights v. Extradition: The
Soering Case, 11 MICH. J. INT'L L. 845 (1990).
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It was the first in which a State not involved in proceedings before the
Commission had brought a case to the Court.8 4 The case was heard
with remarkable expedition, proceedings before the Commission taking about six months after the application was made, the judgment of
the plenary Court being delivered five months after the case was referred to it. The case concerned an important matter of interpretation:
the extent to which a State party to the Convention could be responsible for a violation when the material conduct of which the applicant
complained would be inflicted by another State. The Court was faced
also with an investigation into the adequacy under article 13 of the
remedies to raise such a claim in United Kingdom law.
The application arose out of a decision of the Home Secretary to
order the extradition of Soering, a national of the Federal Republic of
Germany, to the United States on a charge of committing two
murders in Virginia. This charge would have exposed Soering to the
possibility of a capital sentence. Soering was 18 years old at the time
of the alleged offenses and claimed to be suffering from an abnormality
of the mind then.8 The deceased were the parents of Soering's girlfriend, a United States national, who had consented to extradition
from the United Kingdom to the United States and who had been
sentenced to a total of ninety years' imprisonment on her conviction,
following a guilty plea to being an accessory to her parents' murders.
Before it agreed to Soering's extradition (after the English courts had
decided that he might be extradited), the British government had requested from the United States government that, if a capital sentence
were imposed on Soering, it would not be carried out. Because of constitutional considerations, the Federal government had no power to
give guarantees with respect to State criminal proceedings. The Federal and Virginia authorities agreed to bring to the Virginia judge's
attention at the time of sentencing that it was the wish of the United
Kingdom that a capital sentence not be imposed or, if imposed, not be
carried out.8 6 After the request for extradition had been submitted by
the United States but before it had been considered by the English
court, Soering was interviewed in jail in England (where he was detained on an unrelated charge) by a representative of the government
of the Federal Republic. As a result, the Federal Republic requested
Soering's extradition. Because he was an F.R.G. national, the Ger84. See Memorial of the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany (Soering Case),
Eur. Ct. H.R., Cour (89) 74 (Apr. 5, 1989).
85. In re Soering, 1988 CRiM L.R. 307.
86. See Memorial of the Government of the United Kingdom (Soering Case), Cour (89) 72,
at 112-24 (Mar. 29, 1989) [hereinafter UK Memorial].
I
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man courts had jurisdiction over his conduct in the United States. In
West Germany, Soering could not have faced a capital sentence. The
British government did not proceed with the German extradition request, being advised that it was not accompanied by sufficient evidence
to established the primafacie case against Soering necessary to achieve
his extradition.
It was Soering's complaint that, if he were extradited to the United
States, it was likely that he would be convicted and, if convicted, that
he would be sentenced to death. If he were sentenced to death, he
would inevitably be exposed to the "death row phenomenon," that is
to say that he would be detained for a lengthy period between the
passing of sentence and its implementation in very trying prison conditions with other convicted murderers who faced similar sentences, a
situation of particular gravity in this case because of Soering's young
age and fragile mental condition. Soering argued that the "death row
phenomenon" constituted a violation of the standards of Article 3 of
the Convention and that the Convention imposed an obligation on the
British government not to return him to the United States. Soering
contended further that there was a breach of Article 13 of the Convention because there was no effective national remedy which could assess
his claim that the Secretary of State's decision to remove him to the
United States was not in conformity with the United Kingdom's obligations under the Convention. The Commission held by six votes to
five that the extradition of Soering to the United States would not constitute a violation of the United Kingdom's obligation under article 3
and unanimously that it would not constitute a breach of article
6(3)(C). 87 The majority found this case difficult to distinguish from
KirkWood5 8 and, even taking into account Soering's age and mental
condition, held that treatment which he could anticipate in Virginia
was not such as to amount to a violation of the standards of article 3.89
Of the dissenting members of the Commission, Professor Frowein was
influenced by the possibility of Soering being extradited to West Germany; Professor Trechsel took this into account but found it less significant by comparison with a general review of Soering's situation,
which, he decided, would bring Soering within article 3; the remaining
dissenting Commissioners (Danelius, Jorundsson and Vandenberghe),
also finding that the treatment likely to face Soering would breach article 3, laid emphasis on his age and mental condition and took particular account of developments in human rights law since the
87. Soering Case, Report of the Commission, at 47, Eur. Comm'n H.R. (1989).
88. Kirkwood Case, 37 Eur. Comm'n H.R. 158 (1984).
89. Soering Case, Report of the Commission, at 26, Eur. Comm'n H.R. (1989).
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Convention was ratified, such as the provisions in the International
Covenant and the Inter-American Convention. By seven votes to
four, the Commission decided that there had been a violation of article
13.
From the point of view of the Convention, the most important issue was the interpretation of articles 1 and 3: were they together capable of imposing an obligation on a State not to remove a person from
its jurisdiction to another State where it was likely that that person
would be subject to treatment not in conformity with the standards of
the Convention? The British government had reserved its position on
this issue before the Commission. Before the Court, it maintained that
the Convention was clearly against any such interpretation, which
would result in imposing responsibility on one State for injury inflicted
by another, even when the language of article 3 was examined in the
context of the whole of the Convention, including the Preamble. 90
The government said that the Commission had indicated clearly what
a violation in these circumstances would consist of: "the basis upon
which the Commission has held that Article 3... imposes responsibility on parties to the Convention for events over which they have no
direct control, which occur (if at all) outside their jurisdiction has always been and remains unexplained." 9 1 The government then enunciated a series of considerations of international law and policy as to
why the Convention should be interpreted in the way for which it contended. These were:
a) An approach to the contrary was in conflict with the norms of the
international judicial process.
The position here was that an international court should not determine
the obligations of a State not a party to proceedings before it. A decision
of the European Court upholding Soering's claim that he would be exposed to Article 3 treatment if he were returned to the United States
would be tantamount to finding the United States in violation of international law because the standard in Article 3 was a rule of general international law.
Even if there were the power to determine this question, the court should
exercise its discretion not to hear it,92given the non participation of a State
closely affected by any judgment.
b) An approach to the contrary was not supported by the practice of
national courts and the international community.
It had been argued that the practice of national laws and national courts
was to limit and control decisions to remove persons to jurisdictions
90. See UK Memorial, supra note 86, at 50-65.

91. Id. at 54.
92. Id. at 55-58. The government relied on the Monetary Gold case (Italy v. Fr.), 1954 I.C.J.
19 (preliminary question); and Status of Eastern Carelia, 1923 P.C.I.J. (ser. B) No. 5 (Advisory
Opinion of July 23, 1923).
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where they might suffer Article 3 treatment. The government denied
that this practice was sufficiently widespread and uniform to constitute a
general rule.
As for international treaty practice, the government maintained that the
obligation in the U.N. Convention against Torture93 not to return a person to a jurisdiction where he might be subject to torture had been specifically limited to "torture," as compared with the original suggestion
that it cover "cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment:"
thus it would not apply to Soering's case, it not being suggested that his
potential treatment in Virginia would amount to torture. Similarly, Article 33(1) of the Refugee Convention 94 expressly provided protection
against removal in very specific circumstances. Indeed, to impose a necessarily unqualified duty on a State under Article 3 not to return a person to another State where he faced ill-treatment would deprive the
exception in Article 33(2) of the Refugee Convention of any practical
content.
c) An approach to the contrary would impose unacceptable costs on a
State.
Article 33(2) of the Refugee Convention protected a State against the
presence of persons who would present a danger to the community, even
if they did face the prospect of ill-treatment if removed. An interpretation which excluded this protection for a State placed an unjustified burden upon it. In particular, if a State could not extradite a fugitive to a
jurisdiction where he could be tried, such persons would escape punishment and the co-operative arrangements between States for the extradition of wanted persons would be put under stress.
d) That there would be formidable problems of proof about the condi95
tions likely to be experienced in a State not a party to the Convention.
The arguments made by the government may not have been conclusive, but they certainly carried some weight and required answers.
Some answers were supplied by the applicant in a counter-memorial
largely directed to these issues. 96 They focused on the implication in
article 1 of the words "shall secure," which imposed some positive
obligations on a State party to the convention. Those positive obligations could include a duty not to return a person to a jurisdiction
where the substantive content of his Convention rights would be de93. Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, 39 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 51), U.N. Doc. A/Res./39/46 (1984).
94. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951, 189 U.N.T.S. 137,
amended by the Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, Jan. 31, 1967, 606 U.N.T.S. 267.
95. It is to be noted that in Amekrane v. United Kingdom, 1973 Y.B. EUR. CONY. ON
HUMAN RIGHTS (Eur. Comm'n of Hum. Rts.) 356, where there was a friendly settlement, the
mistreatment in the foreign State had already happened and in Altun v. Federal Republic of
Germany, 36 Eur. Comm'n H.R. 209 (1984) (where the applicant complained of likely ill treatment if he were removed to Turkey), the Commission had its own source of information about
conditions in Turkey as a result of the investigations it had made in France v. Turkey, 44 Eur.
Comm'n H.R. 31 (1985).
96. Counter-Memorial of the Applicant (Soering Case), Eur. Ct. H.R., Cour (89) 97 (Apr.
18, 1989).
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nied. Put this way, any judgment of the European Court would pass
only on the obligations of a State party to the Convention and so the
considerations of the position of the third State which the British government had referred to were irrelevant. The adverse consequences
for a State in complying with a Convention obligation could not be an
excuse and were no reason for interpreting the Convention in a way
designed to avoid inconvenience for States at the expense of the effective enjoyment of individual rights.
It might perhaps be observed that the applicant and the government never quite joined direct issue. The government was concerned
with the question of whether there was a duty at all of the kind argued
for. The applicant explained what the nature and consequences of the
duty were - on the assumption that there was one. In the circumstances, it might have been anticipated that the Court would have
brought this matter under close scrutiny. Indeed, the government had
specifically asked that the juridical basis for any judgement against it
be stated clearly so that it and other States could know precisely what
was required of them. 97 Such anticipations were gravely disappointed.
The Court's conclusion on this much controverted matter was simply
one of assertion. It said:
It would hardly be compatible with the underlying values of the Convention, that "common heritage of political traditions, ideals, freedom and
the rule of law" to which the Preamble refers, were a contracting State
knowingly to surrender a fugitive to another state where there were substantial grounds for believing that he would be in danger of being subjected to torture, however heinous the crime allegedly committed.
Extradition in such circumstances, while not explicitly referred to in the
brief and general wording of Article 3, would plainly be contrary to the
spirit and intendment of the Article, and in the Court's view this inherent obligation not to extradite also extends to cases in which the fugitive
would be faced in the receiving State by a real risk of exposure to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment proscribed by that Article. 98
The Court did not say that any treatment which might be incompatible with Convention standards would be an obstacle to removal, 99 but
it did concede that treatment not in conformity with provisions other
than article 3 could raise the same risk of violation when it said,
"[A]n issue might exceptionally be raised under article 6 by an extradition decision in circumstances or risks suffering a flagrant denial of a
fair trial in the requesting country.'1 °
Far from providing the clear juridical basis requested by the Brit97. UK Memorial, supra note 86, at 54,-55.
98. Soering v. United Kingdom, slip op. at 26-27.
99. Id. at para. 86.
100. Id. at para 113.
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ish government, the Court's judgment is obscure. It is obscure first of
all because it says that the content of "inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment" depends on all the circumstances of the case and
that these factors include the question of whether an individual is
sought by extradition.' 01 The notion of what article 3 covers is relative enough as it is, looking only at the treatment applied or to be
applied to the applicant. Widening the context of the inquiry in this
way undermines the human rights quality of the protection given by
article 3 by making it susceptible to public interest derogations and
further increases -the uncertainty as to what treatment falls within its
ambit. If the foreign treatment would fall foul of article 3 standards
anyway, there seems little point in inquiring further into the reason for
the applicant's removal. If the fact that he is being extradited makes a
difference, then it follows that removal to where some Article 3 treatment can be anticipated may be justified because of the public interest
in extradition. In the alternative, where extradition is available to a
third State and that is a relevant consideration, the threshold, it would
appear, might be lowered, so that a State might be in violation of its
obligation under article 3 if it extradited the applicant to state A where
he would suffer nearly article 3 treatment, when it could have extradited him to State B where he would not. The inquiries could be complicated even further if it were to be conceded that different
considerations should apply where the individual is being deported
rather than extradited. From the practical point of view, the desirability of a settled test indicates the superiority of the approach of the
majority in the Commission:
[I]ts task under Article 3 is to assess the existence of an objective danger
that the person extradited would be subject to treatment contrary to this
provision.., the assessment of the risk that a person might be subject to
inhuman treatment contrary to Article 3 depends on an objective assessment of conditions in the country concerned and is independent of the
nationality of the applicant or the possibility of extraditing him to his
own country. 102
From the point of view of principle, neither individuals nor States deserve to have their legal positions determined by adventitious and uncertain contingencies such as those admitted by the Court.
In this connection, the British government's observation should be
remembered that there would be grave difficulties of proof if the Court
were to inquire into the situation in a non-Convention State and to
speculate on the likelihood of the excluded treatment befalling an applicant there. This is a pragmatic objection, suggesting that an actual
101. Id. at para. 89.
102. See Soering Case, Report of the Commission, at 26, Eur. Comm'n H.R. (1989).
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jurisdiction ought not to be exercised if the uncertainty about events in
the non-Convention State cannot be removed. Paradoxically, perhaps
this argument for abstention will favor those States about whose conditions the least could be proved. In the Soering case, there was no
difficulty in obtaining information about the position in Virginia.
The best approach to the dilemma presented by the Soering case is
to look at a State's obligation under article 1 of the Convention. This
first of all makes it clear that the inquiry is into the obligation of a
State party to the Convention, the only proper jurisdiction for the
Court. Nothing is directly decided about the international legal
ramifications of any conclusions about the situation in the non-Convention State, and its non-participation is not, therefore, an obstacle to
the exercise of jurisdiction over the Convention State. Second, it is
well established that the import of the words "shall secure" in article 1
is that a State has some positive obligations under the Convention.
Among those positive obligations are ones to take action where the
substantive harm will be visited on the applicant by a private party, for
10 3
example, to take action against "private" threats to life and security
or against "private" drowning out of protected speech. 104 The content
of positive duties is not uniform and is seldom absolute, but it can
include obligations to prevent harm.l0 5 A positive duty on a State to
prevent the infliction of damage on an individual currently within its
jurisdiction by removing him to another State where the damage will
occur raises no great difficulties of principle under the Convention.
On the other hand, what is required of a State in a case like Soering is
not what is usually required of a State faced with a positive obligation:
ordinarily the State will be required to do something; here it is required not to do something, viz. not remove the applicant. On the face
of it, this seems like the orthodox negative duty, the performance of
which is always within the practical power of the State. Negative duties are hard to imagine as qualified duties. There is, though, a difference here, because the duty is contingent upon the assessment of the
likelihood of damage resulting from the State's action. The qualified
nature of a State's duty in situations like Soering's arises in this way.
A State has a duty to assess the likelihood of damage in the foreign
State and to measure that against its specific duty to protect against
the actual damage in question. For articles 2, 3, 4 and 7, the damage
103. See, e.g., X v. United Kingdom, 5 E.H.R.R. 504, 504-06 (Eur. Comm'n of Hum. Rts.)
(1983).
104. See, e.g., Plattform " .rzte f'ir das Leben"

v. Austria, 139 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A),

(1988).
105. Donnelly v. United Kingdom, 4 Eur. Comm'n H.R. 4 (1976).
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need only be likely, but if it is, the duty not to return is strict. For
articles 5 and 6, a higher likelihood of damage might be required (but
not, as the Court seems to suggest, a likelihood of higher damage "flagrant denial of fair trial"). Where only technical violations of articles 5 and 6 can be strongly anticipated, in principle, there should be a
duty not to return, but it may be that the Court would make a de
minimis exception to cover, for example, concern about periodic reviews of detention under article 5(3) or (4) or the provision of free
interpretation under article 6(3)(e). In other cases arising under articles 8-11, the State would still have an obligation to inquire into treatment in the receiving jurisdiction but would be able to justify action
which led to an interference with a protected right by reference to the
qualifications on its duties in articles 8(2)-11(2). For instance, a refusal by the foreign State to allow the spouse of a person extradited to
follow the applicant to that jurisdiction might find its justification, if
any, as being necessary in a democratic society for the prevention of
crime.
Alternative explanations of the duty under the Convention are
usually too narrow and involve further uncertainties. Professor Vogler's suggestion that the obligation not to return with regard to article
3 treatment on the basis that there is a rule of ius cogens requiring this
result is an example. 10 While the idea of ius cogens is widely accepted, its actual content is a matter of dispute. Even if an obligation
not to torture falls within ius cogens and that obligation extends to not
returning people to jurisdictions where they might be tortured, it is far
from clear that the same characterization can be applied to "inhuman
treatment etc.," particularly as refined by the decisions of the European Convention institutions. Regional ius cogens is not an adequate
explanation either, where the requesting State is out of the region.
It has to be conceded that the conclusion that the Convention requires, in some circumstances at least, a Convention State not to
honor its treaty obligation to extradite a person to another State may
involve a clash of treaty obligations. If the Convention State does not
return the fugitive, it puts at risk its extradition arrangements with the
requesting State. If it does return him, it will be liable for a breach of
the Convention, which will probably include article 50 satisfaction.
But there may be no treaty incompatibility. In the Soering case, the
British government might have expressed itself as unsatisfied by the
guarantees offered by the United States that Soering would not be sub106. Vogler, The Scope of Extradition in the Light of the European Convention on Human
Rights, in PROTECTING HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 22, at 663.
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jected to article 3 treatment.10 7 It had said before the commencement
of the application to Strasbourg that it was satisfied. Soering, of
course, was not. The situation shows clearly the difference between
State rights under treaty and individual rights under human rights
treaties: the former touched Soering's interests; the second protected
his rights. While it might be wise for a government to wait on the
outcome of any Strasbourg proceedings before committing itself, one
would estimate that non-Convention States would not regard Convention obligations of States in the same way as they might take notice of
constitutional limitations on the power of a State to discharge its
treaty obligations.
On the application of the law to the facts of the Soering case, the
Court proceeded in the following way. Soering faced a real risk of the
"death row phenomenon." Although it was not certain that he would
do so, even the British government concluded that there was a "significant risk" that he would. 10 8 While the State of Virginia had to show
that the circumstances of the homicides indicated future dangerousness of the offender or particular vileness, the horrible facts of Soering's alleged offenses pointed firmly in the latter direction. It was true
that there were mitigating factors in Soering's favor, but against those
was the vehemence with which the State prosecutor was pursuing a
capital sentence. Accordingly, the likelihood of Soering being convicted, sentenced to death and facing the "death row phenomenon"
was sufficiently high.
Nevertheless, it was argued by the British government that nothing
that awaited Soering in Virginia, unpleasant though it might be,
amounted to conduct in violation of article 3. It was, of course, not
sufficient by itself that Soering faced the death penalty, because article
2 of the Convention allowed capital punishment in some circumstances. 09 The Court noted that attitudes in the European States
were becoming more hostile to the death penalty. While there could
be circumstances in which return to a foreign State to face the likelihood of captial punishment would raise an issue under the Convention, the development of the aversion to execution had not ruled it out
altogether. In the circumstances of this case, the Court noted that the
107. Ultimately the British government did seek assurances that no capital charges would be
brought against Soering in Virginia. See In re Soering'sApplication, November 21, 1989 (LEXIS,
Enggen library, Cases file).
108. Soering, slip op. at 28.
109. In his concurring opinion, Judge De Meyer did think, for a variety of reasons, that the
United Kingdom was precluded from returning Soering to the United States because of the
threat to his right to life. Soering slip op. at 41. See also comments submitted by Amnesty
International in the Soering case, Eur. Ct. H.R., Cour (89)93 (Apr. 13, 1989). Amnesty was
allowed to make a submission under Rule 37.
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length of time prior to execution, the stringency of the prison regime
for death row prisoners, Soering's age and his alleged mental condition
at the time of the offenses, and the possibility that he might be extradited to the Federal Republic rather than the United States, all contributed to the Court's finding that the "death row phenomenon"
constituted treatment which, if Soering were returned to face it, would
constitute a violation of the United Kingdom's obligations under article 3. The court recognized that the length of time between the imposition and the application of the sentence would, in some large
measure, be due to avenues of appeal afforded to a condemned prisoner. Although some delay would thus be due to the conduct of the
applicant, the seriousness of the sentence demanded such safeguards
and the applicant was not to be disadvantaged for using them.
The outcome of the case on this point is indicative of the singular
position of some States of the United States with respect to routine
capital punishment as compared with other industrial countries.1 10
The need to reconcile the legislative inclination to authorize capital
punishment with the demands of appropriate safeguards against
wrongful conviction or inapposite sentence has caused a dilemma for
the United States which makes it difficult to achieve capital punishment by due process without introducing the collateral evil of the
"death row phenomenon." It is a difficulty which has not been eased
by Supreme Court decisions which have found constitutional obstacles
to the execution of the young or the insane.I1 I The Court's judgment
was of considerable disadvantage to the British governments, which
regards the effective functioning of extradition with the United States
as particularly important to,its campaign against terrorism connected
with Northern Ireland.' 1 2 Any weakening of the obligation by the
United States to return fugitives to the United Kingdom would be
much deprecated.
Ultimately, the Virginia prosecutor filed two charges against Soering, alleging separately the killing of each victim. Neither charge exposed him to a risk of a capital sentence and he was extradited to the
United States on those charges.
110. See AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: THE DEATH PEN-

ALTY (1987); The Politics ofDeath, THE ECONOMIST, Mar. 24, 1990, at 45.
111. See, e.g., Penry v. Lynaugh, 109 S.Ct. 2394 (1989).
112. Ironically, the United Kingdom has been confronted with refusals to extradite fugitives
by the Irish Republic on the basis of analogies with the "Soering principle": Ryan (no guarantee
of fair trial in England); Finucane (danger of ill-treatment by prison staff in Northern Ireland).
For further details, see Zander, Extraditionof Terroristsfrom Ireland: A MajorJudicialSetback,
140 NEW L.J. 474 (1990).
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CONCLUSION

Those with supra-national aspirations for the Court do neither the
Court nor the cause of the protection of human rights in Europe any
service. To imagine the Court as a supra-national body is to conceive
a constitutional anomaly because the other organs of supra-national
authority, a legislature and an executive, are missing. The Court
might be justifiably bolder in filing gaps in the Convention and keeping
its interpretation abreast of developments precisely because there is no
European legislative organ to supplement its work. When it does this,
though, it is incumbent upon it to give a coherent justification for the
steps it has taken: States need to know where they stand, and so do
potential applicants. But this is not, or not necessarily, to claim a
supra-national role. The danger for the Court as I see it is that it will
become embroiled in the details of individual cases and, because of its
aversion to theory, because of its spare form of constructing its judgments and because of the demand of its case-load, not be able to provide judgments which enable national decision-makers and applicants
to know where they stand. The result will be more cases off to Strasbourg to test the limits and to seek to exploit the ambiguities of the
judgments. The coherence of judgments properly demanded of a national constitutional court does not appear to be attainable by the European Court. The need to achieve plausibility for its reasoning may
result in the diminution of the protection of European human rights if
the court seeks to attain this by deferring more to the decision of national authorities, as it has done in the free expression cases.
The implementation of the Eighth Protocol will provide a breathing space to see if the new arrangement can cope with the increasing
demands placed upon the Convention system. Those burdens seem in
no way set to diminish as the States of eastern Europe consider participation in the Council of Europe. The organization already has dealings with Czechoslovakia, Poland and Yugoslavia. Depending upon
the mechanics of German unity, the people of East Germany may be
brought within the system under the umbrella of the Federal Republic's participation. If the revised Convention does prove adequate, the
merger proposals will lose some of their attractiveness - and they
need to be attractive to all the States to be brought to fruition. There
is an opportunity for the development of the court's role in protecting
human rights. There is no need for a revolution.

